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Abstract 
This paper explores a tension between financialisation of electricity infrastructures and 
efforts to bring critical urban systems into common ownership. Focusing on the emerging 
landscape of electricity regulation and e-mobility in the United Kingdom (UK), it examines 
how electricity grid ownership has become financialised, and why the economic assumptions 
that enabled this financialisation are being called into question. New technologies, such as 
smart electricity meters and electric vehicles, provide cities with new tools to tackle poor air 
quality and greenhouse gas emissions. Electricity grids are key enabling infrastructures but 
the companies that run them do not get rewarded for improving air quality or tackling climate 
change. UK government regulation of electricity grids both enables financialisation and 
forecloses opportunities to manage the infrastructure for wider environmental and public 
benefit. Nonetheless, the addition of smart devices to this network - the ‘smart grid’ – opens 
up an opportunity for common ownership of the infrastructure. Transforming the smart grid 
into commons necessitates deep structural reform to the entire architecture of infrastructure 
regulation in the UK.   
 
Introduction 
This paper draws together debates on the financialisation of infrastructure and the urban 
commons. Recent work on urban commons proposes bringing infrastructure into common 
(often localised) ownership, to pursue a balance of economic, social and environmental 
outcomes (Chatterton, 2016; Cumbers, 2015).  In contrast, the drive to make infrastructure an 
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investable ‘asset class’ (Inderst, 2010) shows how infrastructure can be ‘financialised’ so that 
cash revenues are prioritised over all other potential outcomes (O’Neil, 2016; Webb, 2014). 
This tension between the needs of global finance capital, on the one hand, and social and 
environmental outcomes on the other, poses the question whether commons based models of 
urban infrastructure ownership might be more compatible with urban sustainability. 
However, urban commons research has not gone far enough in challenging the economic 
assumptions that underpin financialised ownership models; nor has it justified why the 
management practices associated with commons might deliver a more balanced set of 
outcomes. This paper will explore these underpinning economic rationales using the example 
of electricity infrastructure, and the transition to electric vehicles in cities.  
 
We begin with an investigation of the urban commons, showing that urban infrastructures in 
particular have been a focus of re-commoning. We propose commons approaches to 
infrastructure need an explicit analysis of property rights. We then explore the ‘problem’ of 
infrastructure economics and how it has underpinned the financialisation of electricity grids 
in the United Kingdom (UK). We argue that financialisation forecloses pursuit of positive 
externalities. We then explain our empirical focus on e-mobility in cities, before presenting 
case material which shows how an infrastructure congestion problem can serve to either 
deepen financialised modes of provision, or provide an economically grounded rationale for 
commons based management models.  
This empirical case addresses how air quality pressures are leading to car electrification in 
UK cities. Vehicle fleet electrification can improve air quality, but if the electricity grid 
cannot take the volume of new load this implies, then transport electrification and by 
extension air quality management suffer. However, electricity grids are owned by 
international finance capital, which has no reason to prioritise investments that contribute to 
urban air quality outcomes. Is it just the financialised ownership model that needs to change? 
Or, instead, the entire regulated revenue structure that supports electricity grids across the 
world as well as the economic assumptions that underpin that structure? 
 
 
 
Defining the urban commons 
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There has been a recent resurgence of interest in ‘the commons’ in critical urban studies, a 
political imaginary that potentially could allocate public goods and infrastructure resources 
more equitably than [financialised] neoliberal urbanism (Chatterton, 2016; Enright and Rossi, 
2018; Harvey, 2011). When exploring commons scholarship, it is important to see a spectrum 
between economistic interpretations and socio-political definitions. Economistic 
interpretations develop from a critique of the neoclassical economic literature on public 
goods; the concept of the commons is applied to ecological common goods such as fisheries, 
forests, and clean air, where efficiencies and public benefits can be derived from shared 
governance (Quinn et al, 2010). Collectively known as property rights approaches, these 
studies have had a substantial influence on the natural resource management field (Ostrom, 
2010). Increasingly however, the concept of the commons has been applied to the production 
and distribution of resources in urban space, such as public transit systems, infrastructure, and 
parks (Foster, 2011). This is where the definition begins to blur into socio-political discourse 
on connected social struggles, and post-capitalist provision (Chatterton, 2016). For example, 
when referring to the ‘commonwealth’, Hardt and Negri (2009) include cultural and socially 
mediated commons produced by cities. In this paper, we operate at the property rights end of 
this spectrum and explore whether commons approaches to urban infrastructure can find 
legitimacy even within a neo-classical framing. 
 
Using a commons/common pool resource approach to urban infrastructure, resists the 
reduction of governance options to a binary between private and public expenditure. This 
binary pits neo-liberal enclosure, privatisation and, ultimately, financialisation, against rigid 
state systems of provision. Instead, the emphasis is on designing hybrid forms of collective 
provision around which community and civic actors might mobilise. The normative aim of 
‘commoning’ is to create localised institutions of commodity or infrastructure governance, 
often through negotiation with the state hierarchy (Harvey, 2011; Cumbers, 2015) and with a 
strong de-commodification theme (Bakker, 2007; Gerber and Gerber, 2017).  
Civic commons research has investigated, amongst other forms of infrastructure, water 
(Bakker, 2007), public space (Radywyl and Biggs, 2013), broadband access (Rao and Parikh, 
2003), and energy systems (Becker et al, 2016; Wolsink, 2012). This research has examined 
the commoning of such systems as a bottom-up response to the various enclosure, tolling, and 
financialisation processes that characterise contemporary infrastructure governance (O’Brien 
and Pike, 2015; O’Neill, 2013). Such contributions often present commoning, as a pathway 
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towards multiple social and environmental goals (Frischman, 2005; Hall et al, 2016). For 
example, Becker et al (2016) investigate the social movements that have led to re-
commoning of energy infrastructures in Germany (also Hall et al, 2016; Moss et al, 2015). 
They highlight the role of urban social movements in re-configuring infrastructure 
governance as well as the political drivers of institutional change. Many of these studies, 
however, remain at the socio-political end of the spectrum, where researchers view 
commoning as a “larger collective political experience, and as a way out of a life defined 
strictly by the market and the state” (Huron, 2017 p.1063). Because the urban research on 
commons has largely remained at the socio-political end of the spectrum, the economic 
assumptions at play are rarely challenged on their own terms.  
 
Such terminologies are important, because they underpin the institutional design of urban 
infrastructure systems (Mirrlees-Black, 2014). They are the basis on which economists tasked 
with their governance make decisions (Earle et al, 2016).  Assumptions about the economic 
characteristics of individual infrastructures and their property rights shape how they have 
become financialised, and the institutions that have been built around them to enable that 
financialisation (O’Neil, 2016; Helm, 2009; Vatn, 2007).  
 
Reasoning within neo-classical terminology has proved extremely fruitful in the natural 
resource management field, where property rights scholars have demonstrated that close 
attention to institutional design affects how agents behave towards the finite resources in 
question (Ostrom, 2006; Bowells, 1998); the assumptions we make about individuals, affects 
their willingness to co-operate (Vatn, 2007). Broadly, it shows that marketised incentives 
lead to individual utility maximisation behaviour, while communal rule systems lead to 
enhanced co-operation.  
If the same is true for urban infrastructure resources, then financialised ownership structures, 
whose rationale is generally grounded in neoclassical utility-maximising economic theory 
(O’Neil, 2016; Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006), would design rule systems that reproduce 
and re-enforce market based incentives. If different assumptions were made about the 
resource in question and different theories of individual behaviour applied, then different 
behaviours might be rewarded, reinforced and produced. This might include commons based 
models; but if this commoning is to be seen as an alternative to privatisation and 
financialisation, it should have some economic as well as socially normative rationale. Put 
5 
 
simply, if we assume that infrastructure is more than a simple commodity and design systems 
of ownership and governance that reflect that change, we might achieve different outcomes.  
 
Property rights and infrastructure economics 
 
In identifying the economic rationale underpinning infrastructure financialisation, it is helpful 
to revisit some key assumptions within neo-classical economics. Samuelson (1954) divided 
goods into two types: private and public. Pure private goods are simultaneously rival (if 
individual A is driving a car, individual B cannot drive that car) and excludable (if individual 
B drives individual A’s car without permission they can be excluded from doing so). Public 
goods, on the other hand, are non-rival and non-excludable (Individuals A and B can both 
benefit from national defence without their consumption of sovereign safety being reduced, 
and as sovereign citizens cannot be excluded from doing so). This division allowed neo-
classical economics to estimate the optimal level of public expenditure, assuming that private 
goods exchanged in free markets always discover ‘optimal’ prices. Public goods are services 
where markets do not exist or are impossible to create, and so need to be supported by 
taxation.  
 
Infrastructure is often characterised as a public good (Helm, 2013), but the dichotomy of pure 
private and public goods does not bear closer scrutiny: individuals and institutions can 
organise to consume small scale non-rival goods which, in turn, can be made excludable. 
Buchanan (1965) dubbed these ‘club goods’, a pertinent example being a ‘city car club’ 
where the club membership shares a pool of vehicles that non-members can be excluded 
from. Buchanan proposed the characterisation of a good depends not on its innate qualities, 
but on the social rule systems (institutions) that are created to govern it.  
 
V. and E. Ostrom (1977) identified a fourth type of good known as a ‘common-pool 
resource’ and refined the terminology. Rivalry became ‘subtractability’ because the utility of 
goods is reduced at different rates depending on use intensity or congestion (also Brown et al, 
2014). Excludability was also conceived as a matter of degree. Common pool resources like a 
fishery or agricultural water table have complex subtractability and excludability 
characteristics. They can be overharvested and access may be based on a basket of historical 
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rights claims. Finally, ‘club goods’ became ‘toll goods’ as they can be provided collectively 
municipal/local councils as well as private clubs.  
 
The category of ‘common-pool resource’ (see, e.g., Ostrom, 2010, p. 645) has had a huge 
impact on the practise and study of natural resource management problems, highlighting the 
power of communal ownership and co-produced rule systems particularly for small-medium 
sized natural resource systems. A key ideological division emerged between those who 
followed Ostrom in arguing that polycentric governance, co-operation and institution 
building could effectively manage common-pool resources, and subscribers to Hardin’s 
(1968) ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ argument. Hardin used a common grazed pasture example, 
where more and more commoners add more and more grazing animals until the pasture is 
exhausted. This Hardin argued, meant common-pool resources are best protected when 
higher level authorities either regulate the resource, or assign and enforce private property 
rights to prevent over exploitation (Quinn et al, 2010). In an assessment of the respective 
merits of the two arguments, Coase (1960) argued that the private property approach was 
more efficient at managing externalities and spillover effects.  
 
Here we are directly concerned with the division between the private property approach to 
managing externalities proposed by Coase, and the polycentric commons approaches 
advocated by Ostrom. Ostrom argued that common ownership of the resource in question, 
along with a series of institutional design principles, can find effective ways of both 
controlling over-exploitation and managing externalities (Ostrom, 2010; 2010a). The 
question is, whether the same is true for urban infrastructure systems as for natural resources?  
 
In contrast to natural resources, infrastructure systems have received little attention from 
property rights scholars. In part this is due to three problematic characteristics of 
infrastructure which make analysing it through a neo-classical lens extremely problematic 
(Brown et al, 2014), and often attract analysis to the role of the state in provision.  These 
three problems are explored below using the operating example of the UK electricity system 
and its associated infrastructure. 
 
 
Three problematic characteristics of infrastructure: the case of UK electricity systems  
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The first problem is infrastructure’s public good characteristics, i.e., degrees of non-
excludability and non-rivalry, which necessitate different degrees of state intervention as 
private levels of provision are likely to be below optimum (Helm, 2010; Little, 2005). The 
second problematic characteristic is the natural monopoly tendency of infrastructure (Helm, 
2010; 2013). Natural monopolies arise where there are large sunk costs and increasing 
economies of scale (Brown et al, 2014). Such scale economies lead to few or single providers 
which have absolute power over pricing access to essential services, and therefore the state 
steps in to regulate these prices (Helm, 2013). Further problems arise in ensuring these prices 
cover investment, deepening the state’s role as a contract provider (Helm 2010). 
 
The third and final characteristic of infrastructure is the externality problem. This problem 
arises when both positive and negative spillovers exist, but are difficult to price directly into 
infrastructure provision. For example, it is difficult to charge a firm for positive externalities 
such as labour productivity gains from healthy workers arising from improved sewerage 
provision, or to value the climate externalities of a new road investment without carbon 
pricing. However, since net infrastructure spillovers are generally accepted to be positive 
(Esfahani, and Ramı́rez, 2003), it is beholden upon the state to determine the optimal level of 
provision by accounting for these externalities (Helm, 2010; Brown et al, 2014). 
 
The first two problems can be solved by the direct state provision of infrastructure funded 
through taxation, or by allowing private provision with some form of consumer protection 
from monopoly pricing (Helm, 2009). The question of whether and how privatisation should 
occur for network (i.e., urban pipe and cable) infrastructures rests on whether a legitimate 
institutional regime can be constructed to exclude non-paying users, but cap user charges at 
an acceptable level (Helm, 2009; Torrance, 2008).  
 
The problem of how to manage monopoly infrastructure pricing under private provision was 
salient during the liberalisation and unbundling of the UK electricity system (Meek, 2014). 
For electricity this meant the separation of the system into competitive markets for generation 
(wholesale) and supply (retail), and regulated monopolies for transmission and distribution 
networks. This resulted in a liberalised and unbundled market structure. 
 
Assessing the economic characteristics of each part of the system in turn allowed 
consideration of which elements comprised which type of economic good. Thus generation 
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and supply were classed as private good commodities (Rutledge and Wright, 2011; Kotchen 
and Moore, 2007). A kWh of electricity is both excludable, in that it can be metered, and 
rivalrous, in that one’s neighbour cannot consume the same energy and more generation must 
be added to the system to satisfy their demand. This led to the creation of wholesale markets 
for generation and retail markets for supply (Rutledge and Wright 2011; Lockwood et al, 
2016). The enabling infrastructure, i.e. the high voltage transmission system and low voltage 
distribution networks were cast as a toll good, in that they are easy to exclude users from, and 
the marginal cost of extra use (rivalry/subtractability) was low. This process of parcelling up 
the electricity system for privatisation required an institutional regime which had to manage 
the three ‘problems’ of infrastructure economics outlined above.  
 
The first problem of public good characteristics (excludability) was already dealt with by 
metering and billing. However, the second, (the control of monopoly pricing) resulted in the 
regulation of what grid companies could charge to consumers. This price control was based on 
the RPI-X formula, which allowed revenues of grid companies to rise with the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI, similar to consumer prices index) minus ‘X’ an efficiency metric agreed between 
the networks and the regulator. Almost all grid companies’ revenues are based on this formula. 
This means the ‘balance of risk and reward for regulated companies is determined almost 
entirely by the nature of the RPI-X regulatory regime, and those companies react to that regime 
rather than to market opportunities’ (Lockwood 2016, p. 112). Energy sector research criticises 
the RPI-X model for a lack of innovation incentive (Müller, 2011; Bolton and Foxon, 2011). 
While the new (2014) UK regulatory settlement known as RIIO 
(Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs) endeavours to better reward innovation, another 
underpinning institution of network regulation, the regulated asset base, or RAB model, 
remains relatively unchanged (Wild, 2017) and certainly unchallenged by an urban studies 
community.  
 
The RAB model is a state guarantee that ensures networks will be able to repay the finance 
they need to continue their activities (Stern, 2014). It allows the cost of servicing investments 
to be passed onto customers, ensuring the electricity bill payer carries the risk of new 
investment by the network company (Stern, 2014).  This RPI-X with RAB model has enabled, 
incentivised, and stands as a global ‘example’ for the privatisation and financialisation not only 
of electricity networks but also of gas, rail, airports, communications and water infrastructures 
(Stanley, 2011; Mirrlees-Black, 2014). This institutional regime makes the investment of 
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private capital in infrastructure a relatively low risk proposition. It has led the ownership of 
UK grid infrastructure to include transnational firms, such as JP Morgan, Cheung Kong Group, 
and Berkshire Hathaway. The continuing financialisation of these assets is demonstrated by 
Macquarie’’s recent acquisition of a 61% stake in a gas distribution grid serving 11m homes in 
the UK (Dummett and Salvaterra, 2016). Helm, (2009) argues that the RAB model incentivises 
financialisation by rewarding companies for debt mortgaging of infrastructures over 
operational efficiencies; meaning the gains from financial engineering can easily outweigh 
those from better network management (Helm, 2009;). Wild (2017) demonstrates that small 
(i.e. 0.1%) variations in regulatory assumptions over debt and equity costs can lead to network 
profits/losses of tens of millions irrespective of the actual performance of the network business.  
 
This institutional regime of the RPI-X and RAB model imperfectly deals with the first two 
problems of infrastructure economics, but does almost nothing to reward network companies 
for the multiple externalities which accrue to different stakeholders in different systems. These 
regulated revenues do not reward the pursuit of positive socio-environmental or economic 
externalities that benefit cities (Hall and Foxon, 2014). These positive externalities may 
outweigh the financial benefits that accrue to the infrastructure owner, but since the RPI-X and 
RAB model do not capture them, infrastructure programmes that would otherwise generate net 
gains in terms of public health, environmental protection etc., are marginalised in favour of 
maximising returns to finance capital (O’Neil, 2016; Webb, 2014).  
The potential of smart grid investments to enable these positive externalities has not escaped 
the attention of urban activists, who in several cases have ‘re-communalised’ (Fei and 
Reinhart, 2014) grid infrastructures by taking them into municipal or civic ownership. They 
have done so to both harvest the traditional revenues available, and pursue the positive 
externalities that smart grid investments can confer (Becker et al, 2016). However, taking 
grids into communal ownership may allow some re-direction of earned revenues, but it does 
not change the governing institutions of the infrastructure i.e. the RPI-X and RAB model. Re-
communalising means bringing into communal (usually municipal or co-operative) 
ownership, whereas re-commoning would mean a partial de-commodification. Any re-
communlaised grid may be forced into the same financialised calculus that drives corporate 
grid managers resulting from an unchanged institutional regime.  
Although the importance of urban politics of smart grids have been critically examined 
(Bulkeley, et al 2016, Zhou and Matisoff, 2016), urban and infrastructure studies have yet to 
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question whether the underlying institutional resource regime, i.e., the RPI-X/RIIO/RAB 
toolbox, is fit to secure multiple positive externalities enabled by smart grid investments. Nor 
have commons scholars spent sufficient time coming to terms with the property rights 
implication of these institutional regimes.  
 
Kunneke and Finger (2009), do explore the property rights assumptions that underpin urban 
infrastructure governance. They point to liberalisation as a process of institutional 
fragmentation, competing interests, and mixed incentives; giving rise to complex co-ordination 
issues. They argue this is more akin to common-pool resource governance than toll good 
operation. Künneke and Finger (2009 p.5) further argue that electricity grids are better 
conceived as common pool resources because: 
1. Excludability of access maybe technically possible but politically unfeasible. 
2. Once access is gained it may be difficult to determine how users appropriate services. 
3. Access is open (after a fee) yet these are services from which each individual user takes 
benefit at the expense of others; i.e., there is rivalry in the consumption. 
 
In summary, the institutional regime built around electricity distribution infrastructures in the 
UK stands as an international ‘exemplar’ of how to financialise network infrastructures. This 
regime is legitimated by property rights assumptions that cast the grid as a toll good, and create 
regulated charging structures to prevent monopoly pricing. However, it has not solved the 
problem of multiple externalities, such as economic development, carbon control, and air 
quality management, which are conferred by smart grids on cities. The natural resource 
management community has often found common property regimes are better able to manage 
resources for complex outcomes. Given the multiple positive externalities associated with 
smart grid development in cities (Hall and Foxon, 2014; Webb, 2014), the research question 
is: Would the positive externalities of smart grid infrastructure benefit from a property rights 
settlement that assumed they constituted a common-pool resource as opposed to a toll good?  
  
Methods 
A three phase methodology was used. Phase 1 consisted of case study selection. We selected 
urban e-mobility (the transition to electric car use) as a theory-confirming case (Yin, 2011) 
for two reasons. Firstly, there is evidence suggesting the presence of high positive 
externalities/spillover effects associated with e-mobility at the urban scale in respect of air 
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quality, economic development and carbon control (Hall et al, 2017). Because UK cities do 
not control energy infrastructures but do capture spillover benefits of e-mobility, one might 
expect cities to be increasingly interested in electricity grid governance. Secondly, the capture 
and maximisation of spillover benefits often enrols multiple parties in negotiation and re-
negotiation of boundaries, access and resource use behaviour (Ostrom, 2010). Thus the need 
of e-mobility transitions to enrol smart grids, drivers, city governments and network 
companies manifestly demonstrates a ‘complex co-ordination issue’ which Kunneke and 
Finger (2009) claim as a key characteristic of common pool resource dilemmas. 
 
Phase 2 involved 22 semi-structured interviews with 26 individuals. Participants were 
selected with direct experience of electric vehicle infrastructure management in the UK. 
Questions were formed around the barriers and enablers for increased electric vehicle 
penetration in cities with a specific focus on infrastructure governance. The sample 
comprised: 4 interviewees from city governments, 3 vehicle manufacturers, 2 auto industry 
and public partnerships, 3 charge infrastructure providers, 3 energy utilities, 2 academics, 2 
energy system regulators, 2 fleet managers, and 1 government department.  
 
In phase 3, two expert focus groups were undertaken, designed to understand the co-
ordination issues and trade-offs involved in different methods of managing e-mobility 
transitions and infrastructure stress. Focus group #1 comprised: 1 energy supplier, 2 city 
managers, 1 government sponsored innovation incubator member, 3 academics, 1 charge 
point provider and 1 infrastructure operator. Focus group #2 comprised: 2 officers of the 
energy regulator, 3 vehicle manufacturers, 3 academics, 2 charge point providers, 2 energy 
suppliers, 2 fleet managers, 1 government department, 2 independent energy systems experts, 
1 government sponsored innovation incubator member, and 1 auto industry body. The 
remaining sections report the initial findings of this research. 
 
The role of cities in e-mobility infrastructures 
Until recently a common Cost Benefit Analysis has been used to prioritise transport 
infrastructure spending in UK cities which assessed economic, environmental and social 
impacts of new schemes (DfT, 2016). Using cost-benefit approaches, the state can 
comparatively assess competing infrastructure schemes for the ratio of capital costs against 
other positive and negative externalities. However, since more infrastructure spending power 
12 
 
has been devolved to city-regions in the UK (O’Brien and Pike, 2015a), infrastructure 
assessment has become much more focussed on a single positive externality (spillover 
effect), that of economic development, as opposed to an assessment of economic, 
environmental, and social benefits (Mullen and Marsden, 2015). The common cost-benefit 
framework suitable to public good assessment has been replaced by a hybrid economic 
development assessment.  Following this, new air quality management responsibility and 
road user charging powers have also been devolved (House of Commons, 2016). In short 
there have been a series of changes to transport infrastructure governance in cities. These 
changes have emphasised aggregate private gain over public good gains by focussing on 
economic development spillovers from transport infrastructure schemes. This replaces the 
cost benefit approach of travel time benefits weighed against environmental and social 
impacts.    
Until recently those responsible for sustainable transport spending did not have to consider 
energy infrastructures. However, recent research shows that poor air quality in towns and 
cities in the UK contributes to over 40,000 premature deaths every year (Royal College of 
Physicians, 2016). In July 2017 the UK Government published its Clean Air Strategy (DfT & 
Defra, 2017) as a response to a legal battle over urban air quality. Poor air quality, 
particularly nitrogen dioxide levels from diesel vehicles in towns, mean that legal limits in 
many UK towns and cities are regularly exceeded (Boffey, 2016) This ‘public health 
emergency’ (House of Commons, 2016) led campaigners to push for concerted government 
action that has culminated in government placing further responsibilities on cities to find 
solutions. One proposal is the banning of sales of all new pure petrol/diesel cars by 2040. 
This demonstrates that air-quality concerns are the primary regulatory drivers for the 
electrification of passenger cars.  
 
Supporting electric mobility in UK cities has thus far been limited to parking and charging 
provision; urban transport bodies providing public charge points at strategic locations. This 
provision has become dependent on grants from central government, leading to uneven 
coverage across the UK. Cities have been restricted in how they support electrification because 
parking and charging is the only piece of enabling infrastructure they have control over:  
 
“…at the moment, we are tinkering around the margins, I mean, great, take the Elland Road 
[Leeds] Park and Ride, we’ve got a few charging points there, which is great.  If actually 
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every single car on that car park wanted to charge, it wouldn’t be able to happen would it?  
Because the grid wouldn’t support it and then that… so, at what point do we start to really 
worry about that?” 
(Source: City Government Officer, 2016) 
 
“We kind of know what we need, what needs to happen but it’s just a question often of getting 
collective interested parties pointing in the right direction at the right time.  Because what’s 
been done in the urban environment so far has been pretty much hopeless” 
 
(Source: Energy Supplier, 2016) 
 
This “hopelessness” is in part due to the fact that, after privatisation and subsequent 
financialisation of the UK electricity system, cities have almost no influence over the single 
most important infrastructure for enabling e-mobility, the electricity distribution grid.  
 
 
Energy systems in urban e-mobility 
“So imagine going into any council in the UK and say right tomorrow you are not going to 
control any of your roads, at all, and what we are going to do is we are going to give it to a 
private sector company and then they are going to run your roads without any regard to 
anything you have actually got to say, anything you have got to strategically plan where you 
are going to build your developments, they are going to charge all your road users 
irrespective of anything you have got to say, to travel across those roads. And you have got 
no ability to either control that pricing model or even have a say at the table with regards to 
development […] People would just look at you as if you were just absolutely bonkers. As a 
model to drive or even control your strategic assets... you can see why it wouldn’t work, and 
that’s effectively what we have got in the distribution network” 
(Source: City Government Officer, 2014) 
UK cities have no statutory involvement in the governance of electricity infrastructures. Most 
electricity systems are centralised, built on a model of high capacity plant, connected to 
infrastructure networks which step down voltages to useable levels for homes and businesses. 
Electricity, unlike gas, oil products, or solid fuels, cannot be stored. Electricity systems have 
therefore been built so supply matches demand at any period and system frequency remains 
within design limits. The addition of vehicle batteries to this system does not change these 
parameters, it either places more stresses upon them, or offers more flexible ways of fulfilling 
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them, depending on how the vehicle charge cycle is managed. If the charge cycle goes 
unmanaged this can create problems of ‘grid constraint’ a congestion of the infrastructure due 
to the load EVs place on these distribution networks: 
  
“…Well the challenge that we’ve had is that it is very difficult to supply sufficient power for a 
significant number of vehicles at any one time. In terms our own fleet we have been kind of 
restricted on most sites two or three electric vehicles, sometimes up to five. But where we’ve 
got opportunities in terms of suitability of fleet transition to have say 10, 12 even 20 electric 
vans operating from one site, we’ve not been able to do that because we haven’t got sufficient 
power [grid capacity] at those sites” 
 
(Source: City Government Officer, 2016) 
 
So for home charging, you know.  Clearly there’s a number of issues that come out.  First it’s 
scale.  You’ll get a clustering effect of vehicles in certain neighbourhoods and networks.  A 
sort of panel effect, when one house gets one, another house wants to get one too.  So you’ve 
got a local problem in terms of infrastructure; can that local infrastructure manage the 
demand at the same time? 
 
(Source: City Government Officer [different to above] 2016) 
 
It is at this point of congestion where the economic assumptions that regard distribution grids 
as a toll good break down, as the marginal cost of extra consumption by consumers with EVs 
increases exponentially as the resource becomes congested, In natural resource terms, 
distribution grids are being ‘overharvested’.  
 
“… the effect of the EVs on the grid is, in fact, not only quite high; it’s actually going to make 
things worse and there isn’t any mechanism to stop that from happening.” 
 
(Source: Energy Supplier, 2016) 
 
The low subtractability/rivalry characteristic of a toll good is no longer fulfilled. If the 
property right characteristics are re-considered, several strategies may present themselves 
which could prevent ‘overharvesting’ of the infrastructure.  
 
In a traditional ‘dumb’ distribution grid, once consumers have secured access to the network 
it is impossible to determine whether their consumption contributed to peak levels of 
congestion, as no individualised time of use data was available. Because of this, the high 
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marginal costs of peak consumption are borne by all users. However, the roll-out of smart 
grids, comprising smart electricity meters, new network monitoring technology, and new 
demand side management techniques mean that new opportunities are emerging to monitor 
user demand and manage peak use periods. These new technological enablers fall into two 
categories, demand side participation and demand side management.  
 
Demand side participation involves a behaviour change by a system user to shift demand to a 
different time of day. Demand shifting has three main benefits: 1) to help the system operator 
(National Grid) to keep the system within engineering specifications, 2) to use energy when it 
is cheapest (usually in periods of low demand or high renewable generation), or 3) when any 
extra demand would overload the low voltage infrastructure carrying the electricity. Demand 
response can benefit different parties in the energy system with different incentive structures 
that do not always align.  
 
“…For example, if you are contracting services with the National Grid you need to pay 
attention to what kind of services you are contracting with a DNO1 because you can’t offer 
the same service or the same resources aggregated to both of them.”  
 
(Source: Energy infrastructure provider, 2016) 
 
This is a further characteristic that suggests electricity grids are common pool resources; 
many parties make different claims on each other at different times which lead to complex 
co-ordination issues, as suggested by Kunneke and Finger (2009).  
 
If distribution grids were understood as a common pool resource problem there would need to 
be monitoring infrastructure in place to police extraction (Ostrom, 1990). This has not been 
possible until recently; traditional meters in homes and small commercial premises only 
measure aggregate use, not when that use occurs. This means that most domestic and small 
commercial consumers are settled on a profile, and the characteristics of their resource 
extraction cannot be monitored. Smart metering changes this, as it allows consumers to be 
half hourly settled, i.e., they can be billed for exactly what they use and when they use it: 
 
“So with the half hourly settlement, if you have a smart meter we would be able to charge, put 
your unit rate on a half hourly basis. So you could do that, but actually the costs that will be 
                                            
1 Distribution Network Operator, the company responsible for the local, low voltage grid.  
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incurred in terms of the network costs and the actual wholesale costs of that. So the network 
and wholesale cost we would still being billed as if they were profile customer. Whereas with 
elective half hourly settlement, and in future mandated half hourly settlement, the charges 
will start to become more reflective.” 
 
(Source: Energy supplier 2016; emphasis added) 
 
What is being described above is the need for consumers to have a smart meter and ‘elect’ to 
choose half hourly billing. Being more ‘reflective’ refers to cost reflective pricing. The 
problem with cost reflective pricing for an EV consumer, is that while the distribution 
network companies could remunerate electric vehicle consumers for charging during periods 
of low network use (i.e. during the night) it is the supplier/retailer who has control over the 
billing process. With different households having different suppliers and switching at 
increasing rates, it is extremely difficult to construct a remuneration regime for consumers to 
respond to, if the goal is to better utilise the grid resource (Distribution Network Operator 
officer focus group responses). An additional disincentive is the monetary value of flexibility 
to single consumers: 
 
“It’s very difficult to see why the customer would be incentivised to do that [load shift] unless 
there was a significant financial upside for them to do that.  Which there wouldn’t because 
power with electricity is cheap and unless there was some kind of model that every time you 
flatten your peak at breakfast time, we’ll give you fifty quid…” 
 
(Source: Energy supplier, 2016) 
 
This suggests that, unless the financial rewards/penalties for good/poor demand side 
participation were substantially higher than the marginal cost of use, it is unlikely individual 
EV consumers would find behaviour change worthwhile. They could co-operate with the grid 
company without reward, but as Vatn (2007), Ostrom (2006), and various experimental and 
ethnographic studies demonstrate (i.e. Ross and Ward, 1996), the marketised relationship 
with the private corporate provider does not motivate selfless co-operation.  
 
This is why we are interested in commons approaches to infrastructure use. Monetary 
rewards to rational individuals are small and complex to administer. Another approach is to 
remove the price incentive altogether and operate grid management on a co-operative basis. 
This is technically possible using remote interruption of vehicle charging during peak times 
to protect the grid from overload.  
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This changes the property rights relations with the infrastructure provider from a simple toll 
fee for access, to a managed regime requiring consent and co-operation. However, moving 
from a simple fee for access model to a model requiring more user engagement is difficult: 
 
“I’m aware of the impact on the grid, your average consumer won’t care and couldn’t care 
less.  Why should they?  So there’s a potential ticking time bomb with that which needs to be 
solved.  And one way to solve it is […] adjust the energy flow.  Either reduce it or even make 
it bi-directional so it can supply energy at given times, which, will consumers be happy with? 
Given the large amount of money they paid for the very expensive battery in the car, and 
actually very little financial return for the energy…? 
 
 (Source: City Government Officer, 2016)  
 
The problem with hardwired demand side management (DSM) is that consumers have no 
incentive to allow for flexibility if is it is not remunerated through the bill unless it is part of a 
wider consensual rule system. A consistent theme in smart grid innovation trials has been the 
need to closely engage consumers and provide detailed information on why the network is in 
need of closer management (Fisher et al, 2015; Frontier Economics, 2015). This is because 
the infrastructure constraint issue has an extremely stubborn geography: 
 
“It’s not an issue of total demand […], it’s a question of managing peaks, but it’s worse than 
that. It’s also about managing street by street, house by house…” 
(Source: Vehicle Manufacturer, 2016) 
 
The need to enrol communities on such a tight geography, and provide channels of 
communication which either drive behaviour change or legitimise direct intervention in the 
charge cycle, may be successful in small, well-funded trials, but they are not compatible with 
the current relationship of millions of householders with their distribution network operator. 
This need for personal communication, localised co-operation, and behaviour change in 
favour of resource conservation represents many of the characteristics documented by 
common pool natural resource management scholarship (Vatn, 2007; Künneke and Finger, 
2009; Quinn, 2010).  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
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This research explores a tension between financialisation of electricity infrastructures and 
efforts to bring critical urban systems into common ownership, using the UK electricity grid 
system as an exemplar. The institutions governing the distribution networks, principally the 
RPI-X and the RAB model, were designed for the private provision of a toll good, beyond the 
reach of city governments. This model is unable to account for the positive externalities of e-
mobility in cities, or enrol multiple resource users in new governance structures. This is 
because under a RAB model, with its tendency towards financialised ownership, the 
beneficial owners of the network do not capture positive externalities that include air quality 
benefits [principal in this case], greenhouse gas mitigation, economic development effects 
and the ability to better optimise wider decentralised energy systems of cities (Webb, 2014).  
 
This research demonstrates that new technologies, principally smart metering and demand 
response applications, offer new opportunities to enrol customers in the management of the 
grid resource. Given that grid constraints manifest on a ‘street by street’ basis, the 
geographies and communities of electricity distribution become much more important in the 
future management of the resource. The need to co-ordinate these assets to address the 
‘public health emergency’ of air pollution in UK cities, and a wider drive to strategically 
manage energy assets across cities, to maximise positive externalities, is drawing 
municipalities and communities more concretely into the issues of grid management.  
   
There has been recent interest amongst UK local authorities in taking distribution grid assets 
into municipal control to deal with some of the issues identified above. For example, 
Gateshead City Council has purchased part of the distribution network from the incumbent 
grid company to support a new combined heat and power smart energy centre (Gateshead 
City Council, 2016). This is a small example of re-municipalisation of elements of the UK 
distribution network, which is becoming more attractive to UK cities as grid access and 
management becomes the major barrier to distributed energy system development (Core 
Cities, 2013). In Germany and the US there have been wholesale re-municipalisations of 
distribution grids (Fei and Rinehart, 2014). Such efforts at re-communalising represent what 
some in the urban commons community would see as a positive step towards de-
commodifying critical infrastructure. However, taking a property rights approach 
demonstrates that beneficial ownership of the infrastructure resource by a municipality does 
not make for infrastructure as commons. What matters is how inclined a new owner is to 
manage the infrastructure resource as an urban planning tool to maximise positive 
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externalities (O’Neill, 2016), and thus move away from a pure toll good relationship by 
taking a more pluralistic approach to value.  
 
We asked: would the positive externalities of smart grid infrastructure benefit from a property 
rights settlement that assumed they constituted a common-pool resource as opposed to a toll 
good?  
  
At this stage there appear to be two pathways that the institutional governance of smart grid 
transitions can take. These two pathways are to push the resource towards further enclosure 
and cost-reflective user charging, thus moving toward a private/toll good hybrid model, and 
deepening the monetisation of behaviour change and the calculus of financialisation. The 
second pathway involves using these technologies to manage the grid as a toll/common-pool 
hybrid by enrolling new actors and new governance structures to manage the resource to 
maximise positive externalities. Doing so implies complex co-ordination and co-operation 
issues that are more akin to common-pool resource management problems. The latter option 
would require an entirely new institutional regime to replace RPI-X and the RAB model with 
something much more compatible with common pool resource design principles (Ostrom, 
1990; 2010). 
 
Smart meters with half hourly settlement, consumer participation, and cost reflective pricing 
could very well enable grid operators to charge the marginal cost of provision to those who 
use the grid at periods of congestion. This would fit very well with a neo-classical rational 
economic actor approach, which would stipulate the closer to a private good the resource can 
become the more efficiently it can be managed through a price signal (Coase, 1960). Cost 
reflective pricing of a toll good is much more compatible with the existing financialised 
ownership structure of many distribution network operator companies. However, focus group 
participants in this research highlighted ethical and distributional concerns over the impact of 
this type of pricing on vulnerable consumers who may not have the ability to switch load and 
may get penalised by high peak charges. This echoes Kunneke and Finger’s (2009) point that 
while it may be technically possible to move to a more private logic and marginal cost 
approach it may politically unfeasible due to universal service concerns.  
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The second pathway, managing the grid as a common-pool resource, is arguably more 
complex in that it involves finding a mix of institutional measures and consensual rule 
systems which prevent over harvesting of the resource by deploying demand-side 
management measures and incentivising behaviour change with little or no market exchange 
of value. This would mean constructing an entirely new governance regime that enrolled 
consumers in new relationships with the infrastructure provider through behavioural change 
and consensual rule systems. It is unclear whether the re-municipalised and communalised 
ownership structures emerging through the various examples of commoning seen across 
multiple OECD nations (Fei and Reinehart, 2014; Becker, et al 2016) are more compatible 
with this approach if the underlying institutional regime remains unchanged. However, it is 
clear that accounting for the multiple spillover benefits of smart grids in cities, not least in 
enabling e-mobility, does require a re-evaluation of property rights claims within urban 
infrastructure provision.  This re-evaluation would threaten the existing regime, the sunk 
costs of investors, and the long term stability of the invested capital that feels secure under 
the RAB model. This cannot be taken lightly as it would likely increase the cost of capital, 
and therefore increase energy bills across the nation, if a regulator were even seen to be 
considering such a radical change to the system (Stern, 2013). It is this weight of incumbent 
interests, committed over such long timescales, that any more spatially compatible proposal 
for grid management would have to contend with.  
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